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Introduction:  the challenge of managing a large 
multi-level system   
• This lecture will examine the challenge of managing China’s 
modernization through the lens of central-local relations 
• China is a unitary state but local governments play important roles 
• The state has grown in size and reach: 
– from <5% GDP  to >35% 
– Last decade alone fiscal revenues have grown 10+ fold in real 
terms 
• The government has maintained a five-tier structure of 
administration through most of the past 65 years 
“Can the economy, society, and culture of a modernising China be managed 
effectively from a single centre of political power?  Nobody knows just what the 
appropriate format may be for governing a nation-state with more than a billion 
inhabitants.  Until quite recently, it had never been tried..”  
  -- “Can China be governed from Beijing?” Philip Kuhn (1998) 
China’s  44,126  local governments in 2010 
Organization of lecture 
I. China’s economic miracle and local 
governments’ starring role in story 
II. Local governments also star in creating 
some of the biggest problems 
– The addiction to investment-led growth, 
environmental degradation, corruption, and 
inequality, etc. 
III. The current state of the local state and fiscal 
challenges 
IV. The reform program under Xi Jinping 
V. Conclusions 
The Chinese Economic Miracle 
• GDP growth of 10% p.a. over 30 years has propelled 
it into the front ranks of world power. It is now 
– The second largest economy 
– Largest manufacturer 
– Largest exporter 
– Holds the largest foreign exchange reserves, CO2 
emissions, oil consumption etc. 
• Lifted 500 million people out of poverty  
Since 2000: 
• Per capita income in RMB terms has grown more 
than 5-fold 
• A significant growth engine for the world 
• Emerging as a model for developing countries 
 
Government has laid the foundation of a 
social welfare system with wide coverage 
• Free basic education 
• Near-universal health insurance 
coverage 
• Income support for the poor – dibao 
programs 
• Near-universal pension coverage 
• Gradual integration of migrants into 
urban services 
• Massive investments in roads and highways 
• China had 147 km of expressways in 1988.  Today it has 68,000 
km 
High investments in infrastructure built strong 
foundation for growth & competitiveness 
• China has the world’s largest high-speed rail network, with 11,028 
km of tracks in service in 2013, built since 2007  
• Will reach 15,000 km by end 2015 
 
Cities are increasingly linked by high-speed 
rail 
These investments have bolstered China’s 
competitiveness 
Int. LPI 
Rank
Country LPI Customs
Infrastruc
ture
Internatio
nal 
shipments
Logistics 
competen
ce
Tracking 
& tracing
Timeliness
27 China 3.49 3.16 3.54 3.31 3.49 3.55 3.91
High 
income 3.55 3.36 3.56 3.28 3.5 3.65 3.98
Upper 
middle 
income 2.82 2.49 2.54 2.86 2.71 2.89 3.36
Lower 
middle 
income 2.59 2.23 2.27 2.66 2.48 2.58 3.24
Low 
income 2.43 2.19 2.06 2.54 2.25 2.47 2.98
Ranking in the 2010 World Bank Logistics Performance Index (155 
countries) 
Local governments played a starring role 
 – 1) in the growth miracle 
• Local experiments led the way in many 
reforms: 
– Decollectivisation under “household responsibility 
systems” -  Sichuan and Anhui 
– Township and village enterprises – Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
 
• Local dynamism and competition propelled 
other reforms: 
– Opening to the West  
– Competition for markets 
 
Local governments  
   - 2) in the progress on social welfare 
Provision of social services is responsibility of local governments 
 (billions RMB)
National 
total
Local 
(%)
National 
total
Local 
(%)
Total budgetary expenditure 12595.3 85 job training subsidies 73.7 99
Foreign affairs 33.4 0 social relief 30.2 100
National Defense 669.2 3 urban dibao 66.6 99
Public security 711.2 83 disaster relief 27.2 99
Education 2124.2 95  rural dibao 69.9 100
 o.w. primary schooling 525.9 100 Health 724.5 99
  Junior middle school 353.7 100   Primary health centers 86.3 100
  Senior middle school 169.8 99   Public health 110.2 99
Social security and employment 1258.6 95   Health insurances 365.7 100
Subsidies to urban residents 
basic pension scheme
252.7 97
     New cooperative 
medical scheme (rural 
health insurance)
203.5 100
Subsidies to rural pension 
scheme
93.3 100
      Urban residents basic 
medical insurance
46.9 99
Subsidies to public employee 
pensions
284.9 90 Environment Protection 819.6 89
subsidies for pensions of 
bankrupt enterprises
17.9 100 Low income housing 448.0 91
Counties and townships have the biggest 
responsibilities 
Many of the big programs introduced in recent years are delivered by local 
governments at the grassroots levels 
17% 
17% 
23% 
43% 
Share of direct budget expenditures, 2010 
Central Province  Municipality County+township
A sample of big rural programs 
Local governments 
   - 3) in the infrastructure achievements 
Local government share of total 
expenditure and investment (%) • Of the 3 million km of road 
network, only 175,000 km 
are national level roads 
• Even for the major 
highways, central funding 
comprised less than 10% 
of total investment through 
the mid-2000s 
• Responsibilities are 
shared among all levels of 
government 
Local governments also star in some of the 
biggest problems facing China today 
1. The exclusion of migrants from urban social services 
Migrants face great difficulty enrolling their 
children in urban schools  
• Based on the average 11.1% share of population enrolled in compulsory education in 2011.   
• ** Estimated from various news reports. 
2010 census data, selected cities 
Total 
population Migrants
Potential 
migrant 
enrolment*
Shanghai (2012) 24.30 10.50 1155.0 500.0 2012
Beijing 19.61 7.05 775.0 393.1 2009
Guangzhou 12.70 4.76 523.6 362.4 2011
Ningbo 7.61 2.29 251.7 289.0 2012
Chengdu 14.05 2.62 288.3 173.8 2010
China 1370.54 221.43 24356.9 12000.0
unit:  Million
Reported migrant 
enrolment (year of 
report )**
unit:  Thousand
2.  Local governments have run up a 
mountain of debt 
• There were no national reports of local debt 
before 2011.  First nationwide audit of local 
governments found total debt of ¥10.7 trillion 
at end 2010 
 
• Despite clampdown, second nationwide audit 
found total debt of local governments had 
risen 70% by June 2013 
 
• These numbers far exceed conventional 
measures of debt servicing capacity 
What is the state of the local state?    --  
A.  Resource conditions: 
 
 
 
 
A well-functioning 
intergovernmental 
fiscal system 
channels resources 
to each unit of 
government to 
enable the financing 
of responsibilities 
Evidence from the spending on services show huge improvements 
especially since 2000: 
o Real budgetary expenditure on compulsory education has grown at an 
average annual rate of 24.1% to 2010 
o Health expenditure grew 24.1% p.a. to 2011 
B. Mechanisms for matching resources to 
responsibilities 
The vertical distribution of revenue has been fairly stable 
over past decade (% of total): 
 
While expenditure shares changed dramatically 
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The vertical imbalance 
• Central surpluses are financing some portion of 
expenditures at all subnational levels through transfers:  
to the provinces, prefectures, and counties 
• In aggregate, every level of local government faces a 
budgetary shortfall (= revenue share  - expenditure share) 
1998 2002 2006 2010
Central 21 24 28 34
Provincial -8 -8 -6 -7
Pref/ Municipality -4 -5 -6 -7
County -8 -12 -16 -20
How it is executed -  
Resources and policies are transmitted level-by-level 
downward through the hierarchy 
Central Government  Provinces 
     Provincial Government  Prefectures 
       Prefectures  Counties 
        Counties  Townships 
            Townships  Villages/Farmers 
This is a unique, core feature of China’s decentralized 
system 
Treasury system works the same way:  transfers are 
sent from the central treasury to the provincial 
treasury, from the provincial treasury to the 
prefectural, and onward to the county treasuries. 
 
C. Incentives for local governments 
• Local officials embrace the promotion of economic 
growth as their top priority mission 
 
• Investing in infrastructure has been vital to supporting 
urbanization and economic growth 
 
• This has been mostly financed by local (urban) 
governments 
– Lacking resources in the budget,  local 
governments have turned to land revenues and 
borrowing  
– Prohibited from borrowing, they used special 
financial vehicles - “financial platforms” or “local 
investment corporations” 
Composition of revenues for an average 
prefectural city (2010) 
Special financial vehicles – the local 
investment corporations (LICs) 
• Set up as enterprises under municipal departments, 
LICs are a workaround to the prohibition on local 
government borrowing 
– Local governments acquire farmland and transfer it to an LIC 
– The LIC uses it as collateral to borrow from banks 
– Funds are used to prepare the land for development 
– Land is sold to developers 
– Profits are turned over to the local government 
 
• At the peak, there were more than 10,000 LICs and 
existed in all cities and even some towns   
Cities have thrived under a policy of 
benign neglect 
.. where land selling and backdoor practices such as local 
financing platforms (LICs) were tolerated 
 
• they played a useful role in helping to finance urban 
facilities and infrastructure such as roads and subways 
• but the process opened a soft budget constraint for 
municipal governments 
 
• Unsupervised, the interplay between land and LICs led 
to too much land taking, too many LICs and too much 
borrowing  
 
• Ready availability of funding led to too many wasteful 
and inefficient investments and contributed to urban 
sprawl 
 
 
 
Third Plenum decisions on reforms 
to the fiscal system 
• Rebalancing central-local assignments to better match 
responsibilities with revenues, including allowing local governments 
to borrow for long-term capital spending 
– “opening the front door and closing the back door” by allowing local governments 
to borrow through bond issuance 
• Reining in local government financial vehicles and land finance 
• Strengthening financial management of fiscal resources, including 
making budgets more transparent 
• Recent statements by Xi Jinping and Finance Minister Lou Jiwei call 
for intergovernmental fiscal reform 
– Local governments instructed to propose changes 
– New revision of the budget law has further clarified central-local 
relations 
The thrust of reform is centralizing 
• Rebalancing is to be effected by centralizing some 
functions – e.g. social security and the construction and 
maintenance of large projects that affect more than one 
region 
 
• For programs that have spillover effects, the central 
government will provide transfers to offset local financing 
burden 
 
• Emphasis is on 
– Improving the system of transfers 
– Stopping unfunded mandates – provide transfers when 
central policy causes local expenditure to rise 
China is already heavily dependent 
on the use of transfers 
Subnational 
government 
expenditures GDP
Tax collections of 
higher level 
government
China 2012
  including tax rebates 42.3 8.7 80.8
  excluding tax rebates 37.5 7.7 71.6
Average for 20 
industrialized countries
41.7 5.4 23.2
Average for 37 
developing countries
48.8 3.0 24.3
Transfers as Percent of
Transfers have had only limited efficacy in reducing 
regional disparities 
Not all schools are equal 
Photograph by Wu Hanren/ImageineChina/AP Photo 
Students in Hubei bringing their own desks to school 
The key challenges: 
• Centralizing reforms are ill-suited to the decentralized 
administrative structure  
 
• Land revenues currently significant portion of financing 
to local governments 
 
• More fiscal rules and more stringent financial 
management will further strengthen incentives for local 
government to pursue extrabudgetary revenues and 
activities 
Central government is unusually small 
in China 
• Fewer than 60,000 work in the core ministries and 
agencies 
– Key ministries such as the Ministry of Finance and 
National Development and Reform Commission have 
only 1000 staff 
• Nor are institutions in place to support 
management from the top:  
– A statistical reporting system supplying timely and 
accurate information 
– An audit system, strong public financial management 
systems, rule of law, etc. 
– An independent judiciary to enforce laws and mete out 
punishment for violations   
China has outgrown its administrative 
system 
In the 21st Century, rapid growth of the public 
sector has made it increasingly clear that the 
present administrative structure is unable to 
support the modern welfare state China wants 
to build 
Going forward, the government faces some big 
choices  
The choices may fundamentally change the 
organization of government, the alignment of 
authorities, and indeed, the nature of 
government 
Among the choices: 
• How best to implement national goals:   
– The choice of instruments: financial vs. planning and 
direct allocation of resources; quasi-fiscal tools 
– Who will allocate fiscal resources: Ministry of Finance 
vs. National Development and Reform Commission 
and other ministries 
– Which level of government to deliver which services 
– How will these responsibilities be financed 
 
• What kind of accountability mechanisms: 
– Top-down, bottom-up, and checks and balances 
Management of fiscal resources is 
compartmentalized and fragmented 
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